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Abstract
Burden sharing within an international alliance is a contentious topic, especially in
the current geopolitical environment, that in practice is generally imposed by a cen-
tral authority’s perception of its members’ abilities to contribute. Instead, we propose
a cost sharing mechanism such that burden shares are allocated to nations based on
their honest declarations of the alliance’s worth. Specifically, we develop a set of
multiobjective nonlinear optimization problem formulations that respectively impose
Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC), Strategyproof (SP), and Group Strategyproof
(GSP) mechanisms based on probabilistic inspection efforts and deception penalties
that are budget balanced and in the core. Any feasible solution to these problems
corresponds to a single stage Bayesian stochastic game wherein a collectively honest
declaration is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, a Nash Equilibrium in dominant strate-
gies, or a collusion resistant Nash equilibrium, respectively, but the optimal solution
considers the alliance’s central authority preferences. Each formulation is shown to
be a nonconvex optimization problem. The solution quality and computational ef-
fort required for three heuristic algorithms as well as the BARON global solver are
analyzed to determine the superlative solution methodology for each problem. The
Pareto fronts associated with each multiobjective optimization problem are examined
to determine the tradeoff between inspection frequency and penalty severity required
to obtain truthfulness under stronger assumptions. Memory limitations are examined
to ascertain the size of alliances for which the proposed methodology can be utilized.
Finally, a full block design experiment considering the clustering of available alliance
valuations and the member nations’ probability distributions therein is executed on
an intermediate-sized alliance motivated by the South American alliance UNASUR.
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ON PROPORTIONATE AND TRUTHFUL INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE
CONTRIBUTIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE COST
SHARING MECHANISMS TO BURDEN SHARING
I. Introduction
During the 2016 presidential campaign, NATO saw the reemergence in the Amer-
ican collective consciousness of a contentious topic from which it has been plagued
since its formation: burden sharing. While the relevance of the alliance has not al-
ways been similarly questioned, the debate pertaining to the allocation of burdens
and responsibilities has remained a concern among member nations, as witnessed by
decades of negative media coverage concerning failures to meet the 2% of GDP de-
fense spending requirement. However, measuring the fairness of an alliance’s burden
sharing can be obfuscated by considering metrics individually. For example, con-
tradictions emerge when evaluating a subset of NATO’s eleven existing metrics to
ascertain a member state’s contribution. Denmark has recently failed to meet both
the 2% of GDP defense expenditure and the 20% of GDP Research and Development
requirements, but it outperforms many other allies in contributions to recent conflicts
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2016]. Likewise, the United States continually
surpasses these specific requirements, but it receives a substantive discount in its
monetary contribution to the NATO common budgets. The American economy ac-
counts for over 40% of the alliance’s total GDP sum, but the United States is only
required to provided 22.14% of the common fund budgets. When contributions are
considered based upon common fund budgets and the size of each nation’s economy,
Germany bears the largest proportional share [Mattelaer, 2016]. Thus, depending
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on which metrics are utilized, differing conclusions can be drawn regarding which
country is or is not assuming its proper share of the collective burden. To this end,
we focus on the sharing of alliance requirements such that the allocations exhibit a
form of fairness as defined using coalitional game theory, and that it is in the best
interest of member nations to honestly and transparently reveal their perception of
the alliance’s value. We will utilize the game theoretic notion of the core, removing
emphasis on individual metrics, and replacing it by focusing on whether the country
has incentive to be in the alliance. Should such incentive exist, we seek for nations
to honestly report the maximum they are willing to contribute based on their own
valuation of the alliance, rather than meet a goal from the central authority which
may underestimate or inflate a nation’s burden share. Specifically, we aim to achieve
these goals with smaller regional, international alliances rather than larger, global
alliances.
Whereas, the difficulties in allocating contributions among alliance members is
apparent, history indicates the growth in prominence of interstate partnerships posi-
tively correlates with improving regional stability. An example of this can be observed
within the context of the European Union. Born from the 1951 Schuman Plan, a sim-
ple economic agreement between six European countries gradually transformed into
the European Economic Community in 1958 and to the 28-member European Union
(EU) in 1993. The scope of the EU today has expanded from its humble beginnings
as an economic partnership to encompass a melange of policy areas from climate,
environment, and health to external relations and security, justice, and migration
[European Union, 2016]. Differing views exist on the effectiveness and worth of EU
policy in the region, but there can be little doubt that the EU is the preeminent
regional, interstate partnership in the world.
Many regions throughout the world have labored to mimic the efficacy of the Euro-
2
pean Union, albeit with varying levels of success. Since the dissolution of the Spanish
colonial footprint in the Americas during the mid-19th century, Latin America has
never experienced an epoch of lasting regional stability. The United States’ south-
ern neighbor, Mexico, can be viewed as an exemplar of this instability. After eleven
years of revolution, Mexico gained its independence in 1821 and, in the decades that
followed, suffered a variety of civil and international wars, including the Texas War
of Independence and the Mexican American War. Between 1833 and 1855, Mexico
experienced 36 changes in the presidency. The Second Franco-Mexican War in 1862
installed an Austrian Hapsburg prince, Maximilian I, as emperor. This short-lived
empire ceded way to the forty-year reign of dictator General Porfirio Diaz, which
ended due to the Mexican Revolution and culminated in the uninterrupted line of
presidents from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) until 2000 [Krauze,
1998]. This Dictadura Perfecta (Perfect Dictatorship), as coined by Mario Vargas
Llosa, and the presidency’s transfer to the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), arguably
helped set the conditions that enabled the brutal confrontations with narcoterrorist
that the country faces today [Grillo, 2012].
The unfortunate truth is that Mexico’s tumultuous history is not unique in the
region. Similar historical accounts can be seen throughout Latin America. Chile
and Uruguay, currently bulwarks of South American democracy, were only within
the last fifty years able to rid themselves of the dictatorial regimes of Pinochet and
Bordaberry. We could expand this list even further should we include Panama’s
Noriega or Cuba’s Batista. However, this political instability is not isolated to the
past. Current regimes, such as those in Venezuela and Cuba, illustrate that dictatorial
forces can still thrive in the region. Moreover, many democracies in Latin America are
weak, lack political support, and are corrupt. These political realities, exacerbated
by other major social problems, can create the conditions in which violence and
3
instability multiply. Malva Salvatrucha (MS-13), Barrio 18, and similar gangs plague
society and made El Salvador the per capita murder capital of the world in 2015 [The
Economist, 2016a]. Mexican narcoterrorists have waged war against a government
that has struggled to contain them. In fact, evidence suggests Mexican drug cartels
have facilitated the acquisition and smuggling of weapons by Hezbollah operatives into
the United States, threatening to convert regional instability into global instability
[Bartell & Gray, 2012].
In an effort to unite the region, multiple Latin American interstate partnerships
have been created. The Organization of American States (OAS) includes 35 American
sovereign nations and lists among its objectives (1) strengthening the peace and secu-
rity of the continent, (2) promoting and consolidating representative democracy, and
(3) promoting through cooperative action the region’s social, economic, and cultural
development [Organization of American States, 1993]. The OAS traces its roots back
to 1890 and claims to be the oldest regional institution in the world. However in the
last twenty years a variety of competing organizations have emerged. Another orga-
nization known as Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), comprised of only
twelve South American states, has very similar objectives and was formed in 2010.
The most significant differences between the two are the primary sources of funding
and the member nation composition [Union of South American Nations, 2010]. Like-
wise, the Community of Latin-American and Caribbean States (CELAC), formed in
2011, also mirrors OAS objectives and has a similar composition, but with the exclu-
sion of the United States and Canada [Community of Latin American and Carribean
States, 2011]. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), an alliance composed of
primarily Caribbean island nations such as Haiti and the Dominican Republic, lists
among its ten objectives (1) to affirm the collective identity and facilitate social co-
hesion of the people of the community, and (2) to ensure that social and economic
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justice and the principles of good governance are enshrined in law and embedded
in practice [Carribean Community, 2014]. Article 4 of the Treaty of Basseterre lists
overlapping objectives for the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), for
which membership is fundamentally a subset of CARICOM [Organization of Eastern
Carribean States, 2014]. The lines of distinction and separation of purposes become
even less distinct when other interstate partnerships such as the Latin American
Integration Association (ALADI), the Andean Community (CAN), the Association
of Caribbean States (ACS), the Central American Integration System (SICA), the
Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) and others are examined as a
whole.
The emergence of a single Latin American regional alliance is hampered by dif-
ferences arising from disparate economies, ethnic makeups, and historical tensions,
much as the European continent was, albeit without the specter of two world wars
to promote regional unity. However, the world is observing a global resurgence of
nationalism. The Economist [2014] noted this worldwide surge by citing the election
of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, often referred to as a Hindu nationalist;
public support for France’s National Front; and a Scottish movement which nearly
separated it from the United Kingdom. This global trend has not subsided through
2016, as evidenced by both the Brexit referendum, and the French elections. The
recently inaugurated American president, Donald Trump, has effused a distinct ap-
proach to foreign policy unlike any president since the second world war, creating a
general mood of uncertainty in the international community [The Economist, 2016b].
In such an environment, alliances of all types are likely to be questioned for relevance
and their funding structure scrutinized.
In general, the identification and implementation of an effective mechanism to fund
an interstate organization is an essential task. Two common motifs exist across many
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alliances and international agreements. The first, typically practiced in humanitarian
organizations, is the voluntary solicitation of funds. In such a mechanism the orga-
nization’s funding is, in effect, tithed without any strict requirements. The United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is one such
example. OCHA provides humanitarian aid worldwide. Only 5% of OCHA funding
comes from the UN regular fund. The remainder of the budget is provided by char-
itable contributions from governments, non-government agencies, and other private
entities [United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016a].
Two monetary funds managed by OCHA, country-based pooled funds (CBPFs), and
the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), comprise the re-
maining resources utilized to complete its mission. In CBPFs, donors allocate an
amount for country-specific relief in coordination with OCHA. The CERF aggregates
donor contributions - mainly from governments but also from foundations - that can
be used for worldwide disaster relief [United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, 2016b]. However, for alliances pertaining to military or trade
with larger budgetary requirements, a charitable donation method is less likely to
generate the requisite funds and, by design, is unable to enforce a fair burden sharing
methodology.
The second form of funding, as utilized by the United Nations, the UNASUR,
the OAS, and NATO with regard to common budgets, is to allocate quotas among
countries based on their capacity to pay [Organization of American States, 2005;
Union of South American Nations, 2015]. This general process typically involves the
division of payments based upon some metric of each respective country’s economic
strength (e.g., GDP, GNP, NNP), followed by adjustments based on population and
national debt factor. The calculated quotas generally are bounded between some
maximum and minimum values, or adjustments are performed until such constraints
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are met. This methodology can be viewed as an analog of the Shapley value in coali-
tional game theory, as it attempts to fairly share payments among member states.
However, countries do not always pay their requisite quotas to the coalition, as ob-
served in Venezuela’s failure to pay its OAS quota for many years [Morello, 2016].
Moreover, Greece has recently shown that national economic figures are not necessar-
ily sacrosanct and can be falsified [Papaconstantinoy & Sachindis, 2016]. Thus, the
capacity-to-pay method may be difficult to enforce and its underlying principles are
subject to manipulation. In fact, neither of the two discussed funding methodologies
serve to adequately solicit a country’s true valuation of the alliance, as there exists
the ability to withhold funds or act deceitfully with little consequence.
In the current research, we explore mechanisms that systematically share the bur-
den of an alliance to each member country according to their reported reserve prices
(i.e., the maximum the country is willing to contribute to the alliance). While, in our
context, an agent (i.e., a country) is actually a collection of people and the agent’s val-
uation is generally itself a social choice function, we will assume this value has already
been determined. In this way, a country is asked to reveal its reserve price valuation
of the alliance, and the mechanisms are designed to motivate honest declarations. We
assume the leadership of an alliance is independent and credible. Alliance policies
are therefore unbiased and enforceable. Assuming perfect inspection for this initial
research, we formulate three multiobjective nonlinear programs for which the deci-
sion variables represent inspection probabilities and deception penalties. Any feasible
solution constitutes a budget balanced mechanism in the core, wherein a collective
truthful revelation of reserve prices by all countries is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, a
Nash Equilibrium in dominant strategies, and a collusion resistant Nash equilibrium,
respectively, for our three problem formulations. However, the optimal solution to
any of the three problems induces truthfulness while optimizing with respect to the
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alliance’s central authority preferences. We also examine the respective problems’
convexity, the ability of multiple commercial solvers to find an optimal solution, the
size limitations of solvable instances for all three problem formulations, as well as the
Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanism on a intermediate size alliance motivated
by UNASUR.
The results of this research provide an upper bound on the effort required to
induce honesty in member nations under the assumptions of perfect inspection and
enforceable penalties such that cost shares are not explicitly set by a central author-
ity but are derived from the nation’s own valuation of the alliance. Likewise, we
present a new reformulation of strategyproof and groupstrategyproof mechanisms as
an optimization problem. However, the multiobjective nonlinear programs are not
specific to alliance burden sharing or even international relations. The optimization
problems presented herein are applicable to any general cost sharing problem with
perfect, probabilistic inspection effort and penalties based upon dishonest reporting
of valuations.
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II. Literature Review
This research is focused on the application of cost sharing mechanisms to funding
endogenous to the international partnerships. We begin by reviewing the fundamental
mathematical principles underlying cost sharing mechanisms: game theory, social
choice theory, and mechanism design. The study of cost sharing mechanisms is a
subset of mechanism design, a field itself which can be viewed as the intersection
of traditional game theory and social choice theory. Therefore, an understanding
of these three areas of study is critical to explain our results. Following a review
of these mathematical principles, we examine recent literature conducted on cost
sharing mechanisms and discuss the importance of both cross-monotonic mechanisms
and group strategyproofness. Finally, we conclude with a review of burden sharing
in international partnerships.
2.1 Game Theory
Rooted in utility theory’s fundamental proof that a player’s preferences for out-
comes can be represented by a scalar, game theory studies the interaction of selfish
agents to find useful solution concepts [Neumann et al., 1944]. Specifically, game
theory examines many different forms of interactions between players such as simul-
taneous actions (normal form) and sequential actions (extensive form) with varying
levels of knowledge of past moves (perfect vs. imperfect information) and player
utilities (incomplete information). Game theory can be partitioned as a discipline
based upon whether the modeling focus is the player or the group. Noncooperative
game theory describes the former whereas cooperative, or coalitional, game theory
describes the latter.
We begin by examining noncooperative games. In a perfect information normal
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form game, the most famous among all solution concepts is the Nash Equilibrium: a
set of players’ strategies from which no player benefits by unilaterally changing his
own strategy [Nash et al., 1950]. The strength of the Nash equilibrium as a solution
concept is its existence in every game having a finite number of players and action
profiles. Other well studied solution concepts include the minimax and the maximin
strategies, wherein a player’s action respectively minimizes his opponents maximum
payoff or maximizes his own minimum payoff. In fact, the Minimax Theorem proves
that, in two player zero-sum games, all three of these solution concepts coincide
as the same strategy set [Neumann et al., 1944]. Further solution concepts such
as Evolutionary Stable Strategies and ε-Nash equilibriums have refined the Nash
equilibrium to specific requirements in normal form games. An evolutionary stable
strategy strengthens the Nash equilibrium by requiring that no player benefit by
changing strategies and players are all strictly better off by keeping the specified
strategy [Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008; Smith & Price, 1973]. In contrast, an ε-
Nash equilibrium weakens this constraint and specifies a strategy profile such that
no player can gain more than a very small ε-amount of utility by changing strategies
[Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008].
Beyond the perfect information normal form games, there exists a genre of games
known as extensive form, with either perfect or imperfect information. Extensive
form games introduce a temporal element missing in the simultaneous play of normal
form games. In extensive form games, players move sequentially and, depending on
whether the game is one of perfect or imperfect information, have varying amounts of
information about preceding moves. Perfect information games assume players have
accurate knowledge of all previous decisions. In analyzing such games, the Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is a fundamental tool [Selten, 1965]. The concept
of an SPNE draws on the fact that an extensive form game can be represented as
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a game tree starting with the first player’s decision at the root node, branching at
successive players’ decisions until the last round of play results in utilities identified
for each player at a leaf (terminal) node. An SPNE is a strategy profile wherein, if
the game tree is cut at any level (forming a subgame), the corresponding actions in
the strategy profile correspond to a Nash Equilibrium for the subgame. Imperfect
information extensive form games, introduced by Kuhn in 1953, imply that a player
does not possess knowledge of all previous moves taken; he is unaware of his location
on the game tree [Kuhn, 1953]. For this reason, SPNEs are an inadequate solution
concept for this scenario, as a set of subgames may be indistinguishable from one
another. In fact, the näıve application of SPNEs rules out all possible strategies
[Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008]. Thus, in studying imperfect information extensive
form games with perfect recall, sequential equilibrium specifying a strategy and belief
distribution have proven to be very effective tools [Kreps & Wilson, 1982].
Perhaps the set of games most pertinent to the current research is that of Bayesian
games, also known as incomplete information games. In this context, a group of
players has knowledge of the strategy space available to all players but does not know
for certain each player’s utility of any outcome (i.e., each player’s type is unknown).
Equilibrium is usually computed via the Bayes-Nash solution concept for such games
[Harsanyi, 1967]. In a Bayes-Nash equilibrium no player’s expected utility increases
by changing his own strategy under his beliefs of other players’ strategies. This
equilibrium concept is utilized when expected utility is calculated as ex-ante or ex-
interim, wherein a player has no knowledge of any other player’s type, but does have
knowledge of only his own type. Utility can also be calculated ex-post such that every
players’ type is public knowledge. The solution concept utilizing this form of utility
expectation is called ex-post equilibrium and is similar to Bayes-Nash equilibrium
except for its use of ex-post expectation [Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008]. Ex-post
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equilibrium is a stronger condition than Bayes-Nash, but it does not have the same
existence guarantees present under the ex-ante assumption.
Transitioning to coalitional game theory, the primary questions addressed are
what subset of players will form a coalition, whether the coalition is stable, and how
the coalition should divide its transferable utility among its members. The question
of equitable division of the utility has been famously addressed via the Shapley value
[Shapley, 1988]. The Shapley value captures the average marginal contribution of each
agent and distributes the payoff accordingly [Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008]. While
it answers the question of payment allocation, it does not provide any guarantee
of coalition stability. That is, if the Shapley value is calculated and implemented
for the grand coalition, there is no guarantee the coalition is stable. This stability
question has been answered by a variety of concepts. The core of a coalitional game
is the set of all payoffs such that no sub-coalition has an incentive to deviate from
the current coalition [Gillies, n.d.]. It can therefore be viewed as an extension of
Nash Equilibrium to the coalitional game setting. However, there is no guarantee
that the core of a coalitional game is not empty. For this reason, the ε-core, where
no subcoalition gains more than ε-amount of utility by deviating, and the least core,
the smallest ε-valued ε-core that exists for a game, have been developed. If ε is too
small, the ε-core may still be empty. However, the least core will never be empty as
it comprises the set of vectors that solve the ε-value minimization problem [Shoham
& Leyton-Brown, 2008].
2.2 Social Choice Theory
The theory of social choice concerns the aggregation of individual preferences in
a society essentially from a coalitional game theoretic perspective. That is, social
choice theory is concerned with the maximization of social welfare. However, it is as-
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sumed all agents freely reveal their preferences truthfully and are therefore not selfish.
Social choice theory models the action of a central authority seeking to accumulate
the information provided by the agents in a logical and coherent manner to make a
decision. The central authority will return either a single outcome via a social choice
function or a ranking of all outcomes via a social welfare function developed from
some voting scheme (e.g., plurality voting, cumulative voting, and Borda voting). An
ideal social choice function is weakly Pareto efficient, monotonic, and nondictatorial
[Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008]. That is, the social choice function will not select
an outcome that is dominated by another outcome, its selection remains the same as
more supporters of the choice are added, and no single voter completely determines
the central authority’s selection. Unfortunately, all three of these conditions cannot
be met simultaneously. It has been proven that a Pareto efficient and monotonic
social choice function must be dictatorial [Muller & Satterthwaite, 1977]. A similar
result holds for social welfare functions in that they cannot be simultaneously Pareto
efficient, independent of irrelevant alternatives (i.e., dependent only on the relative
ordering given by agents), and non-dictatorial when there exists more than two alter-
natives [Arrow, 1970]. Both of these impossibilities are often addressed by relaxing
the appropriate Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, or mono-
tonicity requirements. Moulin demonstrated two such approaches for social welfare
functions by restricting preferences to be single peaked and by restricting the social
welfare relation to be only acyclic [Moulin, 1994].
2.3 Mechanism Design
Mechanism Design can be viewed as the intersection of game theory and social
choice theory. We are still concerned with a central authority making a decision using
players’ declared preferences, but now under the assumption that each player is mo-
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tivated by self-interest. Players may hide their true preference values if they perceive
doing so will improve their individual outcome that results from a central authority’s
decision. Mechanism design works in a Bayesian setting wherein there exists a finite
set of players, a set of outcomes, a set of possible player types, and a utility function
for each player. When this Bayesian setting is combined with the mechanism (i.e., a
set of actions available to the agents, and a mapping of action profiles to outcomes)
the result is a Bayesian game. The mechanism is designed to induce desirable traits in
the solution(s) to the Bayesian games [Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008]. For instance,
the central authority may wish that the Bayesian game implements a particular social
choice function in dominant strategies, in a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, or in an ex-post
equilibrium. Alternatively, the central authority may wish that the mechanism in-
duces all agents to take non-deceptive actions (truthfulness), maximizes the sum of
all players welfare (efficiency), or makes neither a profit or a loss (budget balanced).
A fundamental theorem in mechanism design, the revelation principle, relates the
implementation of a social choice function to truthfulness. It states that, if there
exists a mechanism implementing a social choice function, there exists a direct and
truthful mechanism that does the same [Gibbard, 1973]. This theorem enables the
action space postulated in a mechanism to be restricted to only direct actions (i.e.
actions wherein the player only reports his preference). Any solution to a mechanism
design problem can be converted into one in which agents always reveal their true
preferences [Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008]. In terms of mechanism implementa-
tion, dominant strategies implementation is the strongest, but it has been proven
that any mechanism implementing a surjective social choice function having at least
three outcomes that is dominant strategy truthful is also dictatorial [Satterthwaite,
1975; Gibbard, 1973]. Similarly, no strategyproof mechanism (i.e., one in which truth-
telling is a dominant strategy) can simultaneously be efficient and budget-balanced
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[Green & Laffont, 1977].
In the setting of quasilinear preferences (transferable utility), the Vickery-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism is well studied and has beneficial properties [Vickrey, 1961].
The VCG mechanism is a direct mechanism that is strategyproof and efficient. Effi-
ciency is maximized by selecting the combination of reported valuations which max-
imizes the social welfare of the group. Truthfulness is then enforced through a (po-
tentially positive or negative valued) payment to each agent that does not depend
on his own valuation [Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973]. Although the VCG
mechanism has been proven to be the only directly implementable mechanism that is
both truthful and efficient, it is also known to be susceptible to collusion (i.e., it is not
group strategyproof) and expensive to implement [Green & Laffont, 1977; Shoham &
Leyton-Brown, 2008].
Essentially, mechanism design problems are optimization problems wherein the
parameters are privately held information. Vohra demonstrates how incentive com-
patibility, revenue maximization, the core, and efficiency can be formulated using
linear programming techniques and network models [Vohra, 2011]. His work is our
primary motivation for the application of traditional operations research techniques
to mechanism design problems.
2.4 Cost Sharing Mechanisms
Mechanisms designed to share the price of a good or service among many players
are called cost sharing mechanisms. Research is focused on developing mechanisms
that prescribe desired behavior for rational agents. These cost sharing mechanisms
implement an underlying cost sharing function and are typically constrained by some
variation of budget balance, no positive transfer (bidder is not paid to not receive
a service), individual rationality (a player does not receive negative utility from not
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playing), and voluntary participation (players payment doesn’t exceed his bid) restric-
tions. The Shapley value mechanism and the VCG have been applied successfully to
such problems [Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2008]. In both of these cost sharing mech-
anisms, the goal of strategyproofness is accomplished. No single agent is able to
deviate unilaterally and increase his utility. However, individual strategyproof mech-
anisms are susceptible to collusion. It is possible for groups of agents to coordinate
their actions in such a way that truthfulness is not a dominant strategy. Mechanisms
that are resistant to collusion are called group strategyproof if no subset of players
can gain utility by collusion without hurting a member of the same subset. A further
consideration is the inclusion of the cost sharing mechanism in the core. Cost sharing
mechanisms implementing a cross monotonic cost sharing function will exist in the
core whereas, for combinatorial optimization games, the core is non-empty only if
the problem is unimodular (i.e., the linear program relaxation of the integer program
corresponds to an integer valued basic feasible solution) [Deng et al., 1999].
The study of group strategyproof mechanisms was first accomplished by Moulin
[Moulin, 1999; Moulin & Shenker, 2001]. It was shown that if the underlying cost
sharing function is cross-monotonic and budget balanced (i.e., no player is made to
pay more as the size of the coalition increases and the cost is met exactly), there exists
a group strategyproof mechanism in the core to implement it. Therefore, the mecha-
nism induces a stable cost sharing scheme wherein a subset of colluding players will
not all benefit. In a subset of colluding players, at least one of them will be impacted
negatively from this action. This notable result has been extended by many authors
and, for a number of years, was the only known method for constructing group strat-
egyproof mechanisms. While the underlying structure of group strategyproof budget
balanced cost sharing mechanisms was explored and defined, it remained an open
question as to whether there existed another method beyond Moulin mechanisms
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[Penna & Ventre, 2006]. Moulin mechanisms, as they have come to be known, can be
thought of as an iteratively ascending auction. In each iteration, players are simul-
taneously offered the same price. If a player refuses in a given iteration, the offered
price is incremented and offered to the remaining players [Tazari, 2005; Mehta et al.,
2009]. The mechanism terminates when all players accept a given offer. Moulin mech-
anisms have been successfully applied to many situations, including cost sharing in
the electronic market place [Li et al., 2003]. However, in some situations cross mono-
tonicity severely limits the effectiveness of a mechanism. Li et al. (2010) introduced
a cross monotonic cost sharing scheme for the set covering problem, but it is not
budget balanced and is limited to recovering at most 1
2n
of the group cost [Li et al.,
2010a,b]. In fact, utilizing the results of Jain & Vazirani [2001] that show Moulin’s
theorem holds for α-budget balanced cost sharing schemes, it has been shown that
cross monotonic cost sharing functions for the vertex cover and set cover problems
can recover at most 3
√
n and 1
n
of the group cost, respectively. In contrast, Moulin
mechanisms for the facility location game were shown to recover at most 1
3
of the
group cost [Jain & Vazirani, 2001; Immorlica et al., 2008].
The poor budget balance results motivated researchers to relax the core and group
strategyproof attributes of Moulin mechanisms to an approximate level in an effort
to increase the budget balance factor. Acyclic mechanisms represent one such ef-
fort. These mechanisms, similar to Moulin mechanisms, can be understood as an
iteratively increasing auction, but they differ in the price offering method. Whereas
Moulin mechanisms simultaneously offer a price share to all participants, acyclic
mechanisms do so in sequence. Once a player refuses an offer, the iteration termi-
nates and the price share increases. All players who have not yet rejected a proposal
are then offered the new price in sequence. The mechanism continues in this way until
all players accept the offered price. While it has been shown that acyclic mechanisms
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generalize Moulin mechanisms when a null timing function is input (i.e., all players
are offered a price share simultaneously), acyclic mechanisms generally have weaker
guarantees with regard to group strategyproofness. Specifically, acyclic mechanisms
are individually strategyproof but weakly group strategyproof. That is, a subset of
colluding players cannot all benefit, as some of the colluding players will remain indif-
ferent between selecting a truthful or a colluding strategy. Although this is a weaker
guarantee than group strategyproofness, the combination of the non-decreasing na-
ture of offered price shares and the timing function allows acyclic mechanisms to
utilize cost sharing functions that are not cross-monotonic. Many primal-dual algo-
rithms naturally induce acyclic mechanisms having better performance guarantees
than Moulin mechanisms in terms of social welfare maximization and budget balance
[Mehta et al., 2009]. In fact, acyclic mechanisms for the set cover game and facility
location game have been implemented and recovered 1
logn
and 1
1.861
of the respective
group cost [Devanur et al., 2005]. Brenner & Schäfer [2009] have since demonstrated
a method for turning any α-approximate algorithm into an α-approximate budget
balanced mechanism.
Egalitarian mechanisms are a subclass of acyclic mechanisms. Egalitarian mech-
anisms find the most cost-efficient subset of players that have not been assigned a
cost share and then charge the players in the set an identical minimum marginal
cost. This process continues until all players have been assigned a cost. Egalitarian
mechanisms are powerful as they possess a stronger notion of collusion protection
than weak group strategyproofness. Egalitarian mechanisms have been proven to
possess the property of weak group strategyproofness against collectors. This form
of collusion protection strengthens weak group straegyproofness by the notion that
all players prefer receiving service at their valuation price over not receiving it at all.
It has been proven that the set of acyclic mechanisms also possesses the property of
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weak group strategyproofness against collectors [Bleischwitz et al., 2007].
Upon researching the effects of relaxing the requirements of Moulin mechanisms
to improve budget balance and social welfare, it was discovered that group strat-
egyproof mechanisms can be implemented with underlying cost functions that are
not cross monotonic. Instead, group strategyproof mechanisms need only satisfy the
weaker notion of fence monotonicity. Cross monotonicity refers to the properties of
the underlying cost function, whereas fence monotonicity pertains only to the allo-
cated price shares. A group strategyproof mechanism is completely characterized by
satisfying fence monotonicity, combined with the stability of its allocations and the
validity of a tie-breaking rule [Pountourakis & Vidali, 2010]. A fully budget balanced
group strategyproof mechanism for the unweighted edge cover problem has been cre-
ated based upon the concept of fence monotonicity [Immorlica & Pountourakis, 2012].
This finding represents a substantial improvement from the previously proven upper
bound of 1
2
-budget balanced for cross monotonic group strategy proof mechanisms.
In the same paper, an upper bound of 18
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budget balance is provided for the fence
monotonic mechanism in the set cover problem, improving upon the 1
n
upper bound
for Moulin mechanisms.
The aforementioned cost sharing mechanisms approach the problem in a coali-
tional game theoretic manner. In such a scenario, there exists an implicit assumption
that a central authority exists to facilitate the players’ interaction. Decentralized
environments for which no central governing body exists have been modeled utiliz-
ing techniques from non-cooperative game theory. In many situations, such as those
often considered by computer science pertaining to the Internet, a centralized model
for cost sharing is impossible to implement. Cardinal & Hoefer [2010] considered a
vertex cover game wherein each player is responsible for a subset of edges on a graph.
Each player insists upon all of his edges being adjacent to at least one node. In this
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way, the players can be considered to be owners of related constraints in the vertex
cover integer program formulation. The authors only considered pure strategy Nash
equilibrium and analyzed the game primarily with regards to the price of anarchy
and the price of stability, i.e., the ratio of the worst and best Nash equilibrium to the
solution which maximizes social welfare. As pure strategy Nash equilibrium are not
always guaranteed to exist, the authors utilize approximate (α, β)-Nash equilibrium
and introduce algorithms for finding them in multiple classes of problems, including
the use of primal dual algorithms. Other works have analyzed the effect of signaling
or analyzed covering games with a low price of anarchy [Balcan et al., 2014; Piliouras
et al., 2015]. However, one of the most significant works in the area exposed the
relationship between non-cooperative cost sharing and coalitional cost sharing mech-
anisms. If a strong Nash equilibrium exists in the strategic (non-cooperative) form of
the game, then the coalitional form of the game has a non-empty core [Hoefer, 2010].
While the reverse is not always true, the conditions under which strong equilibrium
in cost sharing games exists has been codified [Epstein et al., 2009].
2.5 Burden Sharing in International Affairs
Whereas cost sharing mechanisms adopt a prescriptive approach, the political sci-
ence and economics literature generally adopt a descriptive approach to address the
problem of burden sharing within nation-state alliances. Research on burden sharing
in international affairs relates to the amount of absolute and relative contributions
by players, typically countries, to the financing of a public good. Public goods are
not divisible and are not excludable. Cost sharing mechanisms specific to public
goods have been researched extensively in the literature. Jackson & Moulin [1992]
consider the sharing of cost for an indivisible public project among many players,
and their work was extended by Bag [1997] to account for a divisible project (im-
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pure public good) and freeloaders. However, the most prevalent example of a public
good is national defense, and it is to this end that the majority of burden sharing
research literature is applied. NATO specifically has garnered much attention in this
area. Olson & Zeckhauser [1966] outline a model explaining the contributions of
countries to a coalition with specific emphasis on defense alliances. This model was
then empirically compared with 1965 NATO funding levels to confirm the thesis of
the exploitation of the great by the weak. That is, the model explains the dispropor-
tionate investment of large countries (in terms of population or GNP) to NATO. Kim
& Hendry [1995] conduct a thorough survey of burden sharing research specific to
defense alliances and find two major quantitative methods for approaching the prob-
lem: (1) economic/political analysis of alliance burden sharing, and (2) operations
research analysis. While Kim and Hendry also address economic/political analysis
of individual country’s defense expenditures, the research in this area is much more
qualitative. The following publications are exemplars of Kim and Hendry’s aforemen-
tioned quantitative categories. Weber & Wiesmeth [1991] create an economic model
of NATO, expanding upon Olson and Zeckhauser, applying a cost sharing mecha-
nism to extract each player’s payment, which is a quasi-egalitarian equilibrium and
in the core. The mechanism is stable, efficient, and budget balanced. However, by
the results of Green & Laffont [1977] it cannot be strategyproof. Their research also
demonstrated how nonlinear defense expenditures can contradict the results of Ol-
son & Zeckhauser [1966]. The operations research analysis of burden sharing is best
exemplified by Hens et al. [1992] who apply a multi-criteria decision making model
to identify each country’s percentage burden share for the alliance. Their method
can be viewed as an effort to generalize traditional practices currently imposed by
the UN and the OAS. A set of representative criteria for burden sharing is selected,
such as GNP and national debt as used by the UN, and percentage burden shares
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are subsequently allocated by the model. Notably, all of the aforementioned methods
model nations as individual actors, masking the effect of their respective populations.
Boadway & Hayashi [1999] recommend an alternative approach which assumes that
nations act to maximize the utility of their populations and confirms Olson and Zeck-
hauser’s exploitation of the great by the weak hypothesis. Gupta et al. [2012] and
Gupta [2014] utilize a sequenced voting scheme to invoke the efficient provisioning of
international security under exogenous and endogenous threats.
The emphasis in burden sharing on defense alliances, and NATO in particular, is
likely due to the global security environment at the time of each literature’s publi-
cation, primarily during the Cold War. However, as noted by Chalmers [2001], the
dominance of the military dimension in burden sharing is subsiding. Other public
goods, such as financing EU enlargement, foreign aid to third world countries, and
climate change, are beginning to gain preeminence. This reality is beginning to be-
come apparent in the burden sharing literature as well. Böhringer et al. [2015] have
produced one of the first examples analyzing the effect on the Canadian economy
of six different mechanisms sharing the carbon emissions reduction burden among
provinces per the Copenhagen Accord. However, many research opportunities re-
main pertaining to burden sharing within non-defense related alliances.
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III. Methodology
In this section, we describe the proposed cost sharing mechanisms, introduce requi-
site terminology and parameters, and identify multi-objective nonlinear programming
optimization formulations that identifies mechanism thresholds yielding various guar-
antees of truthfulness. Specifically, we introduce constraint sets that can be utilized
by the mechanism designer to implement the cost sharing function in a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, and in dominant strategies with or without collusion resistance, respec-
tively. The intent is to provide a framework with which a central authority can select
inspection and penalty thresholds to deter deceptive actions.
3.1 Mechanism Intuition
Funding methods utilized by international organizations generally do not assess a
country’s value of the alliance directly. Instead, some sort of equitable price share is
often developed based on a capability-to-pay method which utilizes national economic
indicators and national debt as input variables. This method ignores any strategic
importance the country may place on being in the alliance. Therefore, we propose
a direct mechanism that asks each nation to reveal their valuation of the coalition.
A cost sharing function then utilizes all member nations’ reserve prices to determine
their respective cost shares. We will define the valuation, or type, of each nation by
their reserve price in terms of the percentage of the total alliance cost. We assume
each country’s valuation of the alliance is computed rationally using the principles of
decision theory to balance internal and external risks/rewards (i.e., domestic political
environment or aggressive responses by nonmember states).
Should the mechanism be left as such (i.e., each nation is only asked to reveal their
reserve price), a country is generally incentivized to underreport their true valuation
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if it believes other member states will sufficiently fund the endeavor. To deter such
deception, the mechanism requires an enforcement protocol. The proposed enforce-
ment protocol is a probabilistic inspection action by the central authority combined
with a penalty imposed on any country found, via inspection, to be untruthful. Each
bid in a countable valuation space will be probabilistically inspected independent of
other valuations. For this study, inspection by the central authority is assumed to
be perfect and without cost. That is, if the central authority decides to inspect a
country, it is guaranteed to identify the nation’s true type and the inspection action
has neither a fixed nor a variable cost. The mechanism will allow truthful countries
to be eligible for a subsidy and deceptive countries to be vulnerable of a penalty. If
a country is found to be deceptive, the bid will be corrected to the true value and a
penalty will be assessed. Countries that have not been labeled as deceptive will be
rewarded, as the sum of deception penalties assessed will be equitably distributed as
a subsidy among them.
Under the premise of perfect inspection, it becomes obvious that a probability
one of inspection and/or a sufficiently large penalty for deceptiveness will incen-
tivize truthfulness. Such an authoritarian enforcement protocol may be damaging
to the alliance and difficult to enforce. Therefore, we desire to minimize inspection
probabilities and the magnitudes of deception penalties while maintaining some form
of truthfulness and budget balance. Likewise, the stability of the grand coalition
is paramount. If the cost sharing mechanism induces instability, the international
alliance itself is at risk of dissolution. We address such concerns utilizing a cross-
monotonic cost sharing function to ensure a core allocation. However, the ensuing
cost sharing mechanism can also allow for the alliance to go unfunded, in effect dis-
solving, if after inspection the sum of updated reserve prices is less than the total
cost of the alliance. In such a scenario, the assessment is that the alliance has not
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garnered sufficient support to continue. However, to maintain truthfulness, penalities
and subsidies would still be assessed in such a situation.
The central authority provides a set of declarable reserve prices and a set of
distributions for each country over them. This fact, combined with the stochastic
inspection, signifies the mechanism induced game is a single stage Bayesian stochastic
game. All of the ensuing mechanisms will utilize the expected cost share and penalty
sum from a declaration as the measure of an action’s utility. However, the three
mechanisms differ in how the Bayesian nature of the game is managed.
3.2 Bayesian Incentive Compatible Formulation
We begin the discussion of our multi-objective nonlinear optimization problem
formulations by introducing the requisite sets, parameters, and decision variables in
our international alliance setting.
Sets and Parameters
• Φ = {φ1, φ2, ..., φn} : the set of all n possible types (valuations) in a
common pool available to be the declared or truthful type of a nation.
• M: the set of m countries in the alliance.
• C: a set of colluding countries such that C ⊆ M.
• θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θm}: the true type vector of the m players, wherein θj ∈ Φ,
for j = 1,2,...,m, and where Θ = Φm is the set of all possible true type
vectors of the nations in the alliance.
• S = {s1, s2, ..., sm} : the declared type vector of the m players in the
alliance, wherein sj ∈ Φ, for j = 1,2,...,m, and where S = Φm is the set of
all possible declared type vectors of the nations in the alliance.
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• W = {w1,...,wt}: the vector of inspected types such that W ⊆ Φ
• SW = {sW1 ,...,sWm }: the vector of corrected player types of S after inspec-
tions of declarations in W, wherein sWj ∈ Φ, for j=1,2,...,m.
• αθi,j: the probability that the j th player is truly type θi.
• βθ−j : the probability of θ−j ⊂ θ, i.e., the probability all players other than
player j have a true type, which we represent as θ−j and calculate via
βθ−j =
∏
k=1,2,...,n
k 6=j
αθk,k.
• τ : number of countries labeled as truth telling after inspection.
• σL: number of countries found underbidding after inspection.
• σH : number of countries found overbidding after inspection.
• λj: a deception coefficient such that λ > 1 indicates discomfort to decep-
tion, λ < 1 indicates comfort and λ = 1 indicates ambivalence.
• cW (sj | S−j): cost function yielding the cost share of the j th player playing
sj and all other players declaring S−j, after an inspection W has modified
S to SW . The base model will assume a proportional rule such that
cW (sj | S−j) =

sWj
m∑
k=1
sWk
, if
m∑
k=1
sWk ≥ 1
0, otherwise.
(1)
Decision Variables
• p = {pφ1 , pφ2 , ..., pφn} : the inspection probability vector, wherein, pφi
denotes the probability that a bid of type φi is inspected.
• xL: The penalty assessed to a deceptive action if sj < θj.
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• xH : The penalty assessed to a deceptive action if sj > θj.
We observe that all players’ valuations are drawn from a common pool. Individual
pools are possible and would require only minor changes to the model, but a common
pool makes the most sense for the context of our problem. Also, note that Θ and
S are identical sets representing all possible combinations of size m from Φ where
types can be repeated. A nation’s valuation of the alliance will be represented as
their reserve price in terms of the maximum percentage of the alliance the country
is willing to contribute. We assume that a country’s valuation will not exceed the
cost of the alliance, and thus, the set Φ will contain n discrete elements generally
contained within the interval [0,1]. In some context, it may also make sense to narrow
this interval via an alternative upper bound, BU , and lower bound, BL, such that 0
≤ BL < BU ≤ 1. A scenario with such bounds coincides with the UN or NATO setting
where participating countries are established by treaty, and bounds on minimum and
maximum contributions have historically been mandated.
The distinction between SW and S is necessary to adjust price shares after the
central authority has discovered deceitful action. Upon discovering deceit, the central
authority will adjust all players’ cost shares as appropriate to the updated type vector
and assess penalties and subsidies as required. Furthermore, SW will always be as
truthful or more truthful than S (i.e, SW will have greater than or equal to the
number of truthful players in S). Note that S∅ is equal to S because no inspections
have occurred.
We assume that the true type of each country is independent of the true type of any
other country. Therefore, βθ equals the product of the appropriate αθi,j variables. We
note that this simplification may not always reflect reality. Neighboring countries,
countries with strong economic ties, or countries with similar geopolitical interest
may very well exhibit correlated behavior in terms of their valuation of the alliance.
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However, the proposed model is flexible enough that such correlation effects can be
incorporated with minor modifications.
The cost function cW (sj | S−j) represents the manner in which the price is shared
after bids have been adjusted per the inspection vector W . If the sum of corrected
values meets or exceeds the alliance cost, the alliance cost shares are proportionally
allocated as described in the top term of equation (1). Otherwise, if the corrected
values do not suffice, the alliance is not funded. It can be observed that, in our
proportional cost function, an overbid relative to a player’s true type will result in a
higher expected payment. Therefore, the additional xH penalty will be driven down
to zero in accordance with the objective functions to be introduced in equations (5)
and (6). However, the following formulations will retain xH as a decision variable to
account for cost sharing functions wherein an overbid may result in a lower expected
payment (e.g., Li et al. [2003]).
We now introduce the functions that will be utilized in a plurality of the con-
straints for the mathematical programming formulation to ensure a pure strategy
Bayes Nash equilibrium exists in the game.
Functions
• χWj (S, θ): the penalty and subsidy function associated with the inspection
W , a declared type vector S, and a true type vector θ.
χWj (S, θ) =

xL, if sj < θj and sj ∈ W
xH , if sj > θj and sj ∈ W
−(σL ∗ xL + σH ∗ xH)/τ, if sj = θj or sj /∈ W
(2)
where
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σL =
m∑
k=1
ILk
σH =
m∑
k=1
IHk
τ = m− σL − σH
and
ILj =

1, if sj < θj and sj ∈ W
0, otherwise
IHj =

1, if sj > θj and sj ∈ W
0, otherwise.
• a(sj, p, xL, xH | S−j, θ): the expected allocation function computes the
expected cost share of the j th player assuming he plays sj, given the other
players declared types and the true type vector. The function has the
following form:
a(sj , p, xL, xH | S−j , θ) =
∑
W⊆Φ
[cW (sj | S−j) + χWj (S, θ)]
∏
i=1,2,...,n
φi /∈W
(1− pφi)
∏
i=1,2,...,n
φi∈W
pφi . (3)
To increase or decrease a country’s cost share after the adjustments of the in-
spection action, the penalty and subsidy function, χWj (S, θ) is defined. If a country
is found to be deceptive by underbidding (i.e., the nation’s declared valuation is in-
spected and its valuation is less than its true valuation), a penalty of xL is assessed.
Under parallel conditions, wherein the declared valuation is greater than the true
valuation, the country is said to have overbid and is assessed a penalty of xH . The
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number of underbidding and overbidding countries are discerned through the sum of
the indicator variables, ILj or I
H
j , and are represented by σL and σH , respectively. The
number of countries who are deemed to be truth telling is represented by τ . Truth
telling countries are either assessed and found to be honest or are not inspected at
all and assumed to be honest. In either scenario, truth telling nations are eligible
for a subsidy based upon the amount of penalties assessed to deceitful nations. This
subsidy is shared equally among all truth telling nations.
The expected allocation function sums over all possible outcomes of the random
variable W , ranging anywhere from no types are inspected to all types are inspected.
For an individual outcome of W , the nation will be assigned a cost share and an
appropriate penalty or subsidy. Within the summation over W ⊆ Φ in the right hand
side of equation (3), each term consists of the sum of the cost share and the subsidy
function, given a particular true type vector, declared type vector, high penalty, low
penalty, and inspection vector W , multiplied by the probability of an inspection
vector W occurring. Thus, the expected allocation function assesses the expected
burden share of player j declaring sj. For notational simplicity, we henceforth refer
to this function as a(sj | S−j, θ) because p, xL, and xH are decision variables within
the ensuing math programming formulation.
Given this requisite modeling framework, we introduce the nonlinear multiobjec-
tive optimization problem formulations associated with an international alliance cost
sharing scenario. The first formulation seeks to balance the minimization of func-
tions f(p) and h(xH , xL), whose specific forms are discussed later, while maintaining
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) internal to the mechanism. To induce a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium, it must be assumed that the players in the partially filled
declared strategy vector, S−j, are reporting their true valuation. It is also impor-
tant to note than any feasible solution to the optimization problem is a BIC budget
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balanced mechanism, resulting in a game with a Bayes Nash equilibrium of honest
strategies for all players. However, we wish to find an optimal mechanism with re-
gard to minimizing the inspection probabilities and the magnitudes of the deception
penalties.
BIC Formulation
min
p,xH ,xL
z = (f(p), h(xH , xL)) (4a)
subject to∑
θ∈Θ
βθ−ja(θj | S−j, θ)
≤
∑
θ∈Θ
λjβθ−ja(sj | S−j, θ), ∀j ∈M, sj 6= θj, θj ∈ Φ,
(4b)
0 ≤ pφi ≤ 1, ∀φi ∈ Φ, (4c)
xL, xH ≥ 0. (4d)
The BIC formulation is multiobjective and can be approached utilizing any one of
the available methods in the literature (e.g., see Caramia & Dell’Olmo [2008]). It can
be observed that the first constraint set (4b) in the formulation enforces Bayesian
Incentive Compatibility, assuming ex-interim utility (i.e., a country is aware of its
own type, but not of other countries’ types). While it would be possible to approach
the problem under ex-ante assumptions (i.e., a country has no knowledge of any
country’s type), the definition of deception would become opaque if a country is not
aware of its own type. Constraint set (4b) ensures the expectation of the expected
cost share of declaring a true valuation will be less than or equal to the expectation
when misrepresenting, for each nation and true type. Feasible solutions ensure a
collectively honest declaration of worth by all nations is a Bayes Nash equilibrium. It
is also this same truthfulness constraint which induces a nonlinearity. This is readily
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noted when observing the product of multiple decision variables in equation (3). The
second constraint set (4c) ensures that all inspection probability values are valid, and
the last constraint set (4d) enforces non-negativity of the penalties.
We now introduce two potential forms of the objective function utilizing the
weighted multi-objective method.
Individual Penalty and Inspection Weights (IPIW)
In lieu of equation (4a), we define the objective function to be
z = wLxL + wHxH +
n∑
i=1
wipφi , (5)
wherein wL and wH weight the penalties xL and xH , respectively, and wi-
parameters weight the probability in which type φi is inspected, for i = 1, ..., n.
Penalty Sum and Inspection Effort (PSIE)
We replace equation (4a) with the objective function
z = wP (xL + xH) + wI
(
n∑
i=1
pφi
)
, (6)
wherein wP weights the sum of penalties and wI weights the sum of type in-
spection probabilities.
Both of these forms are advantageous in some respects and limiting in others.
When utilizing the IPIW objective function, a high degree of specification of prefer-
ences is possible. For instance, an alliance may not wish to severely punish countries
who overbid their true valuation and may accordingly place a large weight on wH .
Likewise, if we remove the assumption of cost-free inspection, this method may be
relevant and useful, especially if some bids require more inspection cost than others.
The tradeoff to the robust specification capability is the difficulty in visualization
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of the Pareto frontier in higher dimensions. The PSIE does not allow for the same
specification as the IPIW objective function, but it allows for easy visualization of
the Pareto frontier without regard to the size of the pool of potential valuations, and
so we use it herein to illustrate results.
The solution of the optimization problem will yield the inputs for the central
authority’s enforcement protocol, i.e., the penalties for deceit and the probability
of inspection for each valuation will be specified. Utilizing these inputs and the
aforementioned method of soliciting inputs with the enforcement protocol, the central
authority will have a budget balanced, Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanism in
the core at their disposal. However, should the above methodology be altered such
that the cost function is no longer cross monotonic, there is no guarantee the resulting
cost share allocation will be in the core.
3.3 Alternative Formulations
Our two proposed alternative formulations differ only in the type of incentive
compatibility induced by the mechanism. That is, the solution to the optimization
problem will induce penalties and probabilities such that either strategyproofness or
group strategyproofness is induced.
Strategyproof Constraints (SP)
The strategyproof formulation replaces the first constraint set in the BIC for-
mulation inequality (4b) with the constraint set (7), to induce a game wherein 
every player’s weakly dominant strategy is to act honestly.
a(θj | S−j, θ) ≤ λja(sj | S−j, θ), ∀j ∈M, S−j ∪ sj ∈ S : sj 6= θj, θ ∈ Θ (7)
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Group Strategyproof Constraints (GSP)
The group strategyproof formulation replaces the first constraint set in the BIC
formulation inequality (4b) with a similar set of constraints as in the strat-
egyproof formulation, but constrains the expected contribution of groups to
ensure no player can subsidize another to be dishonest and all players benefit.
For the following GSP constraints, we must first define
• Ŝ =
⋃
j∈C
sj: the declared strategy vector of all colluding players in C.
• θ̂ =
⋃
j∈C
θ̂j: the true type vector of all colluding players in C.
• Ŝ ′ =
⋃
j /∈C
sj: the declared strategy vector of players not in the colluding set.
The following constraint set (8), when substituted in the BIC formulation for
inequalities (4b), induces a weakly groupstrategyproof mechanism:
∑
j∈C
a(θj | θ̂−j∪Ŝ′, θ) ≤
∑
j∈C
λja(sj | Ŝ−j∪Ŝ′, θ), ∀C ⊆M, Ŝ∪Ŝ′ ∈ S : Ŝ 6= θ̂, θ ∈ Θ. (8)
It can be observed that, in the strategyproof variant of the truthfulness constraints,
we are no longer concerned with the expectation of the expected cost share of player
j telling the truth. Instead, each expected cost share a(sj | S−j, θ) is considered
individually. We now specify that regardless of the true type of declared valuations of
the other players, player j ’s best response is to always tell the truth. This indicates
that for all potential games in the Bayesian setting there exists a Nash equilibrium
in weakly dominant strategies that is truth telling for all nations (adding a small
scalar ε to the right hand side of the inequality induces an equilibrium in strictly
dominant strategies). The group strategyproof variant of truthfulness expands upon
the strategyproof definition by allowing for and preventing collusion.
In the previous settings, we have assumed that no communication between agents
occurred to enable collusion. In the group strategyproof setting, it can be viewed as
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if we are allowing any subset of agents to freely communicate with each other in an
effort to coordinate their bids. The constraints in this setting will yield solutions to
the optimization problem such that the penalty and probability values associated with
deceitful action are a sufficiently large deterrent that, even with collusion, any player’s
best response remains to tell the truth for all potential games. It can be observed that
when C is a singleton set (i.e., a player is considering unilateral deception), constraint
(8) is identical to constraint (7) and will prohibit unilateral deception. Thus, the SP
constraints and contained in the GSP constraints. Consider the following example to
illustrate the difference between the SP and GSP formulations. Under joint truthful
reporting Player A and B incur a cost of 0.2, and under joint deception Player A
incurs a cost of 0 while Player B incurs a cost of 0.3. Such an outcome would not
violate (7) as the joint truthful and joint deceitful strategies are never compared.
Thus, Player A and B could benefit from collusion by splitting their joint cost (e.g.,
Player A and B both pay 0.15). Instead constraint (8) ensures the cost incurred by
any colluding subcoalition acting truthfully is less than or equal to acting deceitfully,
thereby preventing a player to benefit by subsidizing another. As in the SP constraint
set, adding a small scalar ε to the right hand side of the inequality induces a group
strategyproof instead of a weakly group strategyproof cost sharing mechanism.
The outlined frameworks allow for an international alliance to solicit and obtain
preference information from its member nations and affect a selected expectation of
truthfulness (e.g., BIC, strategyproofness, or group strategyproofness), assuming all
actors are rational. The SP and GSP formulations no longer directly depend on the
probabilities, αθi,j, but this underlying information can still be utilized by the players
to inform which game in the Bayesian setting is being played.
In some instances, the central authority may wish to avoid undesirable outcomes
from irrational agents. While the mechanisms resulting from any of the aforemen-
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tioned formulations will induce a budget balanced outcome in equilibrium, irrational
actors may cause outcomes that overcollect, pay a country to be in the alliance, or
assess penalties when the alliance is unfunded. Overcollection may occur when all
countries act dishonestly and the alliance is funded. If all countries are found to be
deceptive, no country is eligible for the subsidy and the money must either remain
with the central authority or be disposed of similar to the VCG mechanism. In the
same situation but when a small number of countries are deemed to be honest, said
countries may be positively compensated for their participation (i.e., they are paid to
be in the alliance). Finally, if declared bids do not meet the collective requirement,
the alliance may remain unfunded, and our mechanism will still inspect and assess
penalties to countries. Thereby, there exists the opportunity for honest countries to
be compensated by deceptive countries while the alliance remains unfunded. To ac-
count for the last two scenarios, we introduce a no positive transfer constraint (i.e.,
no player is paid for participating).
No Positive Transfer Constraint
a(sj | S−j, θ) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈M, θ ∈ Θ, S−j ∪ sj ∈ S,
This constraint set will prevent irrational actors from forcing the aforementioned
undesirable outcomes. However, its inclusion into the BIC, SP, or GSP formulations
may cause an instance to be infeasible.
3.4 Convexity of Formulations using BIC, SP, or GSP Constraints
The convexity of our non-linear formulations will determine the type of solution
methodologies at our disposal. Given our objective function is linear, should the
feasible region be convex, then convex optimization methods such as gradient-based
procedures can be utilized to guarantee optimality. Otherwise, a global solver or
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heuristic procedure will be required. In order for a feasible region to be convex, the
constraints when expressed in standard form (i.e., gi(~x) ≤ 0, i = 1, ...,m) must also
be convex. The literature demonstrates two popular methods to determine the con-
vexity of a function. The first method as discussed by Winston & Goldberg [2004]
utilizes the principal minors of the Hessian. The signs of the determinants of the
principal minors determine whether or not the Hessian is positive definite or semi-
definite, the former implying strict convexity of the function and the latter convexity
of the function. Similarly, Bazaraa et al. [2013] utilize an equivalent approach based
on the eigenvalues of the Hessian; a Hessian having all non-negative-valued eigenval-
ues corresponds to a convex functions, whereas a Hessian having all positive-valued
eigenvalues corresponds to a strictly convex function.
Theorem 3.4.1 The BIC formulation is a non-convex optimization problem.
Proof By contradiction, assume the BIC formulation induces a convex optimization
problem. Therefore, all of the functions comprising the BIC constraint set are convex,
such that
g
θj ,sj
j (p, xL, xH) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈M, θj ∈ Φ, sj 6= θj ,
where
g
θj ,sj
j (p, xL, xH) =
∑
θ∈Θ:sj=θj
a(θj | S−j , θ)βθ−j
− λj
∑
θ∈Θ:sj=sj
a(sj | S−j , θ)βθ−j . (9)
Therefore, the Hessian, H
θj ,sj
j (p, xL, xH) of g
θj ,sj
j (p, xL, xH) is positive semidefinite
(i.e., having strictly non-negative eigenvalues) for any player j.
Consider a problem instance having Φ = {0.5, 0.7} andM = {A,B,C}, λj =1 for
all players, and αθi,j identical for every player strategy pair. In this setting, for Player
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A, setting θA = {0.7} and sA = {0.5}, the function g0.7,0.5A (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) reduces
to g0.7,0.5A (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) =
(
96
323
)
− 4p0.5xL−
(
96
323
)
p0.5, and H
0.7,0.5
A (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH)
has the following form:
H0.7,0.5A (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 −4
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
−4 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
The eigenvalues of H0.7,0.5A (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) are (−4, 0, 0, 4), which indicates that
H0.7,0.5A (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) is not positive semi-definite and g
0.7,0.5
A (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) is
not convex, resulting in a contradiction.
Theorem 3.4.2 The SP formulation is a non-convex optimization problem.
Proof As with the BIC formulation, we assume that the SP formulation induces a
convex optimization problem. Then all of the SP constraints are convex, such that
qθ,Sj (p, xL, xH) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈M, θ ∈ Θ, S−j ∈ S, sj 6= θj
where
qθ,Sj (p, xL, xH) = a(θj | S−j , θ)− λja(sj | S−j , θ). (10)
Consider a problem instance with Φ = {0.5, 0.7}, M= {A,B,C}, and λj =1
for all players. Again examining Player A but now with θ = {0.7, 0.7, 0.7} and S =
{0.5, 0.5, 0.7} (i.e., Player A and B are underbidding), we see that qθ,SA (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH)
reduces to qθ,SA (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) =
(
24
323
)
−
(
24
323
)
p0.5−
(
3
2
)
p0.5xL. The Hessian, H
θ,S
A (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH)
of qθ,SA (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) is equal to
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Hθ,SA (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 0 −3
2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
−3
2
0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
Its eigenvalues are {−3
2
, 0, 0, 3
2
}, indicating that Hθ,SA (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) is not positive
semi-definite and qθ,SA (p0.5, p0.7, xL, xH) is not convex, resulting in a contradiction.
Corollary 3.4.3 The GSP formulation is a non-convex optimization problem.
Proof The SP constraints are a subset of the GSP constraints.
3.5 Relative Formulation Size Induced via BIC, SP, or GSP Constraints
The number of constraints increases as the truthfulness requirements strengthen.
This result can be observed by inspecting the BIC, SP, and GSP constraint sets.
For instances having a large magnitude of available strategies in Φ or having a large
number of countries in M, the generation of the constraint sets may become com-
putationally burdensome. A similar effect is possible on the computational effort
required to solve the problem. Therefore, in this section we investigate how the size
of each constraint set relates to m and ‖Φ‖.
Assume there are three countries in an alliance and there are two available types
for each country such that Φ = {0.5, 0.7} . If each country has a positive probability
of having a true type of any element in Φ, we have ‖Θ‖ = 8 (i.e., the quantity
of available true type vectors), as presented in Table 1. Given that player types
are independent of each other and come from a common pool, these results can be
generalized in the following manner:
‖Θ‖ = ‖Φ‖m = ‖S‖. (11)
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Table 1. Formulation Size Example: All Type Vectors Existing in Θ by Country
A B C
0.5 0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.7
0.5 0.7 0.5
0.5 0.7 0.7
0.7 0.5 0.5
0.7 0.5 0.7
0.7 0.7 0.5
0.7 0.7 0.7
From equation (11), it can be observed that the number of countries in the alliance
has an exponential effect on the number of true strategy vectors available, whereas
the cardinality of Φ has a polynomial effect for a given number of countries. Although
‖Θ‖ is most relevant to the size of the SP and GSP constraint sets, we will first utilize
the aforementioned results to illustrate the size of the BIC constraint set.
Table 2. Formulation Size Example: αθi,j for Each Country and Type Combination
Type A B C
0.5 0.5 0.1 0.5
0.7 0.5 0.9 0.5
The BIC formulation requires a probability distribution over Φ for each player.
For our sample instance, these probabilities can be found in Table 2. Given this
information, we will investigate the BIC constraint, given that Player A has θA = 0.7.
We know that the possible combinations of reported types is the same as the possible
number of true types. Therefore, considering Table 1 also as a representation of
possible reported types by each player, we observe that the first four rows in Table 1
represent reported type vectors wherein Player A is dishonestly reporting sA = 0.5.
The remaining rows represent type vector declaration such that Player A is reporting
truthfully, or sA = θA. The corresponding BIC constraint has the following form:
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0.7
1.7
(0.1)(0.5)+0.7
1.9
(0.1)(0.5) + 0.7
1.9
(0.9)(0.5) + 0.7
2.1
(0.9)(0.5)
≤ (0.1)(0.5)[(1− p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.51.5) + (1− p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.5
1.5
)+
(p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.71.7 + xL) + (p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
1.7
+ xL)] + ...+
(0.9)(0.5)[(1− p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.51.9) + (1− p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.5
1.9
)+
(p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.72.1 + xL) + (p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
2.1
+ xL)], (12)
which simplifies to
573
1615
≤ 1367
4845
+
352
4845
p0.5 + p0.5xL (13)
The left hand side of inequality (12) sums over the the last four rows in Table 1
and represents declarations wherein all three countries truthfully reveal their types.
For this reason, inspection probabilities and penalties are irrelevant. No penalties will
be assessed even if an inspection occurs because all agents are acting honestly. The
only computation is the expected value of Player A’s contribution by multiplying his
contribution in each fully truthful declaration vector by the probability the truthful
vector occurs.
The right hand side of the inequality considers scenarios wherein Player A acts
dishonestly. In each term, the probability of a truthful vector occurring is multiplied
by the product of the cost and penalty corresponding to a deceitful declaration and
the probability of the corresponding inspection vector that induces it. For example,
the first term considers Players B and C acting honestly by bidding {0.5, 0.5}, but
Player A underbidding at sA = {0.5}. The last term considers a similar situation, but
with Players B and C having true types of {0.7, 0.7}. With two possible types in Φ,
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there exist four inspection possibilities: no inspection, inspect {0.5} declarations only,
inspect {0.7} declarations only, and inspect both declarations. The probability of each
of these scenarios occurring is determined by our decision variables, p0.5 and p0.7. It
can be observed that the probability of each of the inspection scenarios occurring is
multiplied by the adjusted payment modified by the penalty and subsidy function, as
defined in equation (3).
Following in this manner, it can be shown that the number of constraints required
to enforce BIC is equal to m‖Φ‖ (‖Φ‖ − 1). The logic for this quantity of constraints
is that a given player must be better off declaring his true type when considering
the possibility of choosing any of the other (‖Φ‖ − 1) types. Thus, for a given player
and a given true type, there are (‖Φ‖ − 1) constraints. As the given player has a
positive probability of having any true type of the ‖Φ‖ types available, the number
of constraints for a given player is ‖Φ‖ (‖Φ‖ − 1). To find the total number of BIC
constraints in the set, we must then consider the total number of players to obtain
m‖Φ‖ (‖Φ‖ − 1). This implies that, in our instance having three players and two
types in Φ, the number of BIC constraints required is six, in addition to the 2‖Φ‖
probability constraints and the two penalty non-negativity constraints, resulting in
12 total constraints. Notice, these results only hold when all players are have a type
space of the same cardinality. In the case of independent spaces, Φj, for each player
j, the number of BIC constraints equals
∑m
j=1‖Φj‖ (‖Φj‖ − 1)
When examining the SP formulation, a similar logic can be utilized, but without
the luxury of assuming other players in the declaration vector are acting truthfully,
meaning that decision variables may exist on both sides of the inequality. We now
consider the game wherein all players have a true type of 0.7. In order to be strat-
egyproof, Player A must be indifferent to the actions of Players B and C. For each
possible set of declarations submitted by Player B and C, the rational choice for
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Player A must be to truthfully report his type. We consider each of the possible
declarations of Players B and C in turn.
Case 1: Player B and C report truthfully 0.7
0.7
2.1 ≤(1− p0.5)(1− p0.7)(
0.5
1.9) + (1− p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.5
1.9)+
(p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.72.1 + xL) + (p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
2.1 + xL) (14)
Case 2: Player B reports truthfully {0.7} and Player C deceives
(1− p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.71.9) + (1− p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
1.9)+
(p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.72.1 −
xL
2 ) + (p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
2.1 −
xL
2 )
≤ (1− p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.51.7) + (1− p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.5
1.7)+
(p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.72.1 + xL) + (p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
2.1 + xL) (15)
Case 3: Player B deceives and Player C reports truthfully 0.7
(1− p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.71.9) + (1− p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
1.9)+
(p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.72.1 −
xL
2 ) + (p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
2.1 −
xL
2 )
≤ (1− p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.51.7) + (1− p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.5
1.7)+
(p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.72.1 + xL) + (p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
2.1 + xL) (16)
Case 4: Player B and C deceive
(1− p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.71.7) + (1− p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
1.7)+
(p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.72.1 + 2(xL)) + (p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
2.1 − 2(xL))
≤ (1− p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.51.5) + (1− p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.5
1.5)+
(p0.5)(1− p0.7)(0.72.1 + xL) + (p0.5)(p0.7)(
0.7
2.1 + xL) (17)
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In this example, the constraints consider all possible combinations of Player B’s
and Player C’s actions and demonstrate a scenario wherein there exists only one
type of deceitful action (i.e., declaring 0.5 when Player A’s true type is 0.7). In
general, the number of deceitful actions will equal (‖Φ‖ − 1). From these results we
can observe that, for each true type vector, a given player has (‖Φ‖ − 1) ‖Θ−j‖ =
(‖Φ‖ − 1) ‖Φ‖(m−1) constraints to require a truthful action. This results from the
fact that, for a given true type vector, every possible deceitful action by a given
player must be an inferior course of action when all combinations of the remain-
ing players’ declarations are considered. Thus, in order to define all constraints
associated with a given player, we must consider all true type vectors resulting in
(‖Φ‖ − 1) ‖Θ−j‖‖Θ‖ = ‖Φ‖2m − ‖Φ‖2m−1 constraints. Fortunately, in the current
scenario having a common Φ available to each player, the constraints between players
are symmetric. That is, should the true type vector be {0.5,0.5,0.5}, then the truthful
constraint for Player A on the declared vector {0.7,0.5,0.5} will be identical to Player
B on the declared vector {0.5,0.7,0.5} and Player C on {0.5,0.5,0.7}. It is sufficient
in this symmetric situation to concern ourselves with only the constraints for a single
player when solving the optimization problem. This implies that, in the example of
three players and two types in Φ, the number of SP constraints required is 32 and the
total for the problem instance is 38. However, in general, to define the total amount of
SP constraints, we must consider all players, resulting in
∑m
j=1 (‖Φj‖ − 1) ‖Θ−j‖‖Θ‖
constraints where Φj is equal to the number of declarations available to the jth player.
The GSP formulation can be considered as a generalization of the SP formula-
tion wherein the SP formulation only considers the singleton set of colluding players.
It is well known from Pascal’s triangle that the sum of the number of combina-
tions across all subset sizes is equal to 2n. When considering the size of C, we
exclude the empty set and observe the cardinality of C is equal to 2n − 1. There-
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fore, in general, the GSP formulation sums over all 2n − 1 terms and has the form∑
C⊆M((
∏
j∈C ‖Φj‖)− 1)‖Θ−C‖‖Θ‖. The first term in the summation represents the
number of group dishonest actions available to the colluding set of players. This
term is then multiplied by the number of different declared types available to the
non-colluding players and then by the number of possible true types, respectively.
However, when players draw from an identical type space, we can again leverage the
problem’s symmetry and consider any subset of M such that it contains exactly one
element of size 1 through m. We call any such subset M̂ and its cardinality is simply
m. Summing over each of these terms, the number of GSP constraints under symme-
try is
∑
C∈M′(‖Φ‖
‖C‖− 1)‖Θ−C‖‖Θ‖. As with SP under symmetry, we do not need to
consider each colluding set individually. We only need to concern ourselves with the
benefit a colluding set of a given size can achieve. Thus, the reduction of combina-
tions from 2n−1 to m serves to decrease the size of the GSP constraints dramatically
for large instances having symmetry. In fact, the number of GSP constraints required
for the example problem is 136.
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IV. Results
The findings of the preceding chapter preclude the guarantee of gradient-based
techniques finding an optimal solution to the BIC, SP or GSP problems. Thus, in
this chapter, we explore the efficacy of several meta-heuristics and a global optimiza-
tion solver with regard to these problems. We compare methods available in the
MATLAB 2015a Optimization Toolbox, namely the GlobalSearch, MultiStart, and ga
functions, utilizing the base settings to the global solver BARON. The GlobalSearch
function implements the procedure introduced by Ugray et al. [2007] wherein a scatter
search algorithm generates potential starting points, executes a gradient-based search
(i.e., fmincon) on a feasible starting point, and then iterates through the remaining
points by deeming them good or poor candidates. An additional gradient-based
search is performed on each of the points deemed to be good candidates, whereas the
poor candidates are discarded. The MultiStart procedure performs a gradient-based
search technique from each point in a collection of uniformly distributed solutions
within the feasible region. For consistency, we specify the gradient-based search as
fmincon for use within both the GlobalSearch and MultiStart metaheuristics. The ga
function applies a genetic algorithm with base settings including an initial solution
population from a uniform distribution, a parent selection function utilizing a uniform
distribution, a uniform binary crossover technique and a Gaussian mutation function
[The MathWorks, Inc., 2015]. Of the three MATLAB heuristics, MultiStart and ga
are compatible with parallel processing, whereas GlobalSearch is not. BARON is a
general purpose, global optimization solver for mixed integer nonlinear programs. It
utilizes a branch and reduce technique wherein a convex relaxation is generated and
solved, a feasible solution is recovered, and the feasible region is subsequently parti-
tioned to generate subproblems. This process continues for subproblems, enhanced by
both feasibility and optimality-based range reduction, until a global optimal solution
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(within some small ε tolerance) is identified with finite computational effort. Herein,
we invoke the BARON commercial solver using the default termination criteria of a
0.001 (0.1
Section 4.1 solves the previously introduced sample instance for all problem vari-
ants using each solver. Utilizing the PSIE objective function with equal weights, we
first examine the performance of each solver in terms of solution quality and compu-
tational efficiency. We then examine the effects of weighting the two PSIE objectives
differently to explore the Pareto front associated with these problems. In Section
4.2, we expound upon the formulation size discussion from the previous section and
demonstrate memory limitations encountered when solving the BIC, SP and GSP
problems. Particularly, we show the difficulty in implementing the SP and GSP for
large values of m or ‖Φ‖. Finally, Section 4.3 tests the superlative solution method
identified in Section 4.1 on larger instances of the BIC problem.
4.1 Small Instance Testing
Analysis of Solver Performance.
In this section, we solve a BIC, SP and GSP problem instance withM = {A,B,C},
Φ = {0.5, 0.7}, λj = 1 for all players in M, and equal weights in the PSIE objective
function. This problem instance, and all following problem instances, are constructed
utilizing two 2.60GHz Intel Xeon processors and 192GB of RAM within MATLAB.
Solver methods internal to MATLAB are solved on the same machine. However, when
invoking BARON, these problems are converted into a GAMS output file and solved
on the NEOS server hosted by the University of Wisconsin in Madison [Czyzyk, J.,
Mesnier, M. P., and Moré, J. J., 1998; Dolan, E, 2001; Gropp & Moré, 1997]. Each
method is given an upper bound of one hour to solve this small instance example.
Our results in terms of solution quality of the objective function and solution time in
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Table 3. Small Instance Testing Results for BIC, SP and GSP
Problem BARON* MultiStart** GlobalSearch*** ga**
Objective Solution Time(sec) Objective Solution Time(sec) Objective Solution Time(sec) Objective Solution Time(sec)
BIC 0.4709 0.315 0.4709 22.195 0.4709 734.121 0.4711 85.192
SP 0.482 5.915 1.2549 98.973 2.473 1013.452 0.4942 115.438
GSP 0.482 58.597 0.494 104.30 0.494 1187.666 0.491 153.186
* Problems constructed in MATLAB, GAMS file generated in MATLAB and uploaded to NEOS server.
** MATLAB parallel processing capability enabled.
*** Incompatible with MATLAB parallel processing. Solver utilizes serial computation.
seconds are summarized in Table 3.
We do not explicitly differentiate between the time spent solving a problem in-
stance and the time spent building it. Instead, the total processing time is aggregated
into the metric called solution time. This is done for consistency. For example, while
BARON only requires the constraint building function to be called once, MultiStart
and GlobalSearch may call the original constraint building function multiple times
throughout the algorithm. Furthermore, the parallel algorithms in MATLAB make
the distinction between build and solve times difficult to ascertain. Therefore, we are
comparing the total efficacy of the process from problem construction to optimization.
The results in Table 3 indicate BARON finds the best solution in the shortest
amount of time for all of the problem instances. When evaluating the MATLAB
metaheuristics, ga is the second best performing algorithm with a minimum and
maximum objective gap to BARON of 0.04% and 2.53%. However, it requires a min-
imum three-fold increase and a maximum of 270-fold increase in time from BARON
to arrive at its solution. MultiStart is the second best performing algorithm with re-
spect to solution time, but it falls short of ga in terms of solution quality. MultiStart
arrives at a minimum and maximum objective gap to BARON of 0.00% and 160.35%
while requiring a minimum twofold and maximum 70-fold increase in solution time.
GlobalSearch is the worst performer in both metrics. Its minimum and maximum
objective function gap to BARON is 0.00% and 413.07% and requires a minimum of
17-fold and a maximum of 2331-fold increase in solution time. Of note, the minimum
and maximum relative gaps for each metaheuristic compared to BARON occurred
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Table 4. BARON Solution Time Breakout for Small Instance Testing
Problem Build Time(sec) Solve Time(sec) Total Time(sec)
BIC 0.312 0.003 0.315
SP 5.911 0.004 5.915
GSP 58.590 0.007 58.597
when solving the BIC and SP problems, respectively.
We close this discussion on solver performance by examining the solution time
required for BARON in more detail. While BARON clearly outperforms the other
tested solvers, the reported decision variable values are not necessarily optimal. Test-
ing performed by Neumaier et al. [2005] demonstrated an experiment wherein BARON
arrived at an incorrectly reported optimal solution for 1.8% of instances in an exam-
ined set. Also, it can be observed in Table 4 that the majority of BARON’s solution
time required does not result from the solution time, but from the time required to
construct the instances. These results motivate further examination in subsequent
sections on the computational effort required to create large instances of the SP and
GSP problems.
Analysis of Decision Variables for Varying Truthfulness.
Examining the reported solutions by BARON and ga in Table 5 illustrates that,
in this instance, the required increase in inspection probability and penalty values
appear marginal compared to the increase in the strength of truthfulness constraints
from BIC to GSP. However, in the arena of international alliances, consider the follow-
ing: in December 2015, the UN’s Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee
recommended the General Assembly adopt a $5.4 billion budget for 2016-2017 [United
Nations, 2015]. Should our example alliance of Countries A, B and C require its mem-
bers to contribute this amount and adopt the solutions from BARON in Table 5, a
BIC mechanism would require xL = $1.068 billion, and a SP or GSP mechanism
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Table 5. Reported Optimal Decision Variables for Small Instance Testing
BARON ga
Problem p0.5 p0.7 xL xH p0.5 p0.7 xL xH
BIC 0.273 0.00 0.1979 0.00 0.266 0.00 0.2051 0.00
SP 0.280 0.00 0.202 0.00 0.2945 0.00 0.1997 0.00
GSP 0.280 0.00 0.202 0.00 0.301 0.00 0.190 0.00
would require xL =$1.091 billion, an increase of $21.6 million (2.07%), in addition to
the 0.007 increase in inspection probability, for a stronger guarantee of truthfulness.
For many countries in the United Nations, this is a small increase when compared to
their GDP. For example, the World Bank estimates the GDP of the United States to
be $17.95 trillion and the GDP of Greece to be $195.21 billion. For other countries,
such a fine represents a more substantial fraction of their GDP (i.e., Mongolia and
El Salvador with respective GDP estimates of $11.75 billion and $25.85 billion). The
World Bank also estimates another UN nation, Tuvalu, to have a $37.75 million GDP.
The Tuvalu economy would struggle to bear the burden of the increase in penalties
alone imposed via the BIC and SP mechanisms. Therefore, as a central authority of
the international alliance, the damage attributed to a country required to increase the
expectation of truthfulness is relative, and alternative solutions attained by varying
weights on the objectives may be necessary.
For this reason, we use BARON to estimate the Pareto front associated with
these problem instances by applying the PSIE method and varying wP from 0.1 to
0.9 in increments of 0.1, such that wI = 1 − wP . Utilizing these results we begin to
observe the trade-off between inspection frequency and the size of deception penalties
in Figure 1 and Table 6. At one extreme, we see the convergence of solutions across
all instances to an inspection effort of one and a null penalty as wP approaches
one. This is due to the central authority’s desire to minimize the penalties applied,
requiring it to inspect and correct all information received to induce truthfulness
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Table 6. Pareto Front Point Estimates for Small BIC, SP and GSP Instances
BIC SP GSP
wI wP Penalty Sum Inspection Effort Penalty Sum Inspection Effort Penalty Sum Inspection Effort
0.9 0.1 0.743 0.091 0.758 0.094 0.762 0.093
0.8 0.2 0.471 0.136 0.482 0.140 0.482 0.140
0.7 0.3 0.342 0.178 0.352 0.182 0.349 0.183
0.6 0.4 0.260 0.223 0.266 0.227 0.263 0.230
0.5 0.5 0.1979 0.273 0.202 0.28 0.202 0.282
0.4 0.6 0.148 0.334 0.150 0.343 0.150 0.343
0.3 0.7 0.104 0.416 0.105 0.428 0.105 0.428
0.2 0.8 0.062 0.545 0.062 0.56 0.062 0.558
0.1 0.9 0.017 0.818 0.015 0.848 0.015 0.839
among its members. At the opposite extreme, we have an asymptote where the sum
of the inspection effort approaches zero as wI approaches one. The central authority
wishes to inspect as infrequently as possible but levies a heavy fine on a deceitful
nation should it detect dishonesty. The results indicate, for this instance, the central
authority would not be required to allocate much more effort for inspections or levy
substantially higher penalties to attain truthfulness under stronger assumptions (i.e.,
comparing BIC to SP or GSP). In fact, the SP and GSP curves are nearly on top of
one another.
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Figure 1. Pareto Front Estimates of BIC, SP and GSP Small Instances
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This problem instance raises a question regarding the relevance of the GSP for-
mulation. The solutions to all of the aforementioned SP and GSP instances, even
with varying weights, are similar. We note this phenomenon does not hold for the
general case, but it is a product of the penalty and subsidy function introduced in
this research. In the aforementioned instances, the optimal SP decision variables
limit the amount of potential subsidy in the system to such a degree, that little if any
additional effort is required to prevent collusion. Thus, some of the optimal solutions
to the SP instances are group strategyproof. However, the feasible regions of SP
and GSP remain distinct, even if the optimal solutions nearly coincide. In fact, the
optimal SP decision variables with wI = 0.9 are infeasible in the corresponding GSP
instance. In other words, the induced game is not group strategyproof.
Should additional subsidy be introduced, nations could experience more collusion
benefit. Consider an alternative penalty and subsidy function wherein, if the central
authority detects a deceitful action, it contributes xL+xH of its own funds to be shared
as a subsidy, in addition to the deception fines. Figure 2 shows the Pareto fronts
associated with BIC, SP and GSP for the alternative penalty and subsidy function.
In these GSP instances, additional inspection effort and/or deception penalties are
required to deter collusion. Thus, the difference in effort between levels of truthfulness
seems to be significantly influenced by the underlying penalties and subsidies used as
incentive.
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Figure 2. Pareto Front Estimates of BIC, SP and GSP Small Instances with Alternate Penalty and Subsidy Function
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4.2 Memory Limitations
In Table 4, the build times required to construct problem instances and GAMS
model files indicate a possible trend toward higher build times for larger instances.
Graphically, we can visualize the dramatic increase in the number of constraints
required for each formulation in Figure 3.
BIC Constraints SP Constraints
GSP Constraints
Figure 3. Comparison of the Number of Constraints Required for Varying m and ‖Φ‖
From inspection of Figure 3, the difference in magnitudes of the number of con-
straints required for each formulation is immediately apparent. At m = 4 and
‖Φ‖ = 8, the BIC, SP, and GSP problems necessitate 224, 1.468 × 107, 6.471 × 107
constraints, respectively, when it is assumed a common Φ is available to all players.
Thus, it can be observed that memory limitations will become an obstacle sooner for
GSP and SP than for BIC.
The machine utilized for the current study is equipped with 192GB of RAM.
The ensuing discussion addresses an upper bound on problem size based on available
RAM, independent of algorithm form or memory structures utilized to construct any
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Figure 4. Feasible (m,‖Φ‖)-combinations for a Computer with 192GB of RAM or 64
bit Theoretical Max (234 GBs)
problem instance. For BIC, SP and GSP, should we assume that only Θ, the set of
true type vectors, is stored in memory, the gray region under the lower curve in Figure
4 represents feasible Θ in MATLAB not exceeding 192GB of RAM. These calculations
are based on the maximum array able to be stored in memory with m‖Θ‖ = m‖Φ‖m
double entries requiring eight bytes apiece.
By holding m constant, it can be observed that ‖Φ‖ has a polynomial effect on
memory required, whereas m has an exponential effect for a fixed ‖Φ‖ . Hence, in
Figure 4, the memory limit is reached earlier by increasing m in isolation than by
increasing ‖Φ‖. Considering the UN has 193 members, NATO 28 members, and the
OAS 21 members, Figure 4 illustrates that meaningful instances for these alliances
could not be be solved on the computer used in this study. Furthermore, a theoretical
upper limit on RAM capable of being installed in a 64-bit computer can be derived
from the largest unsigned integer possible (e.g., 264 bytes) as this equals the number of
addressable units. Thus, without concerning ourselves with operating system require-
ments, a maximum theoretical RAM limit for a 64 bit computer is 234 GBs. In Figure
4, the yellow area under the higher curve represents Θ not exceeding the theoretical
value of memory. We observe that a 25 nation coalition is limited to five declared
types in Φ. An alliance the size of the UN would require so much memory that Φ
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would be a singleton set. However, solving such an instance would be meaningless as
it is impossible for any country to act deceitfully.
Having inspected the global memory limitations across all problem types, we now
investigate the memory limitations inherent to the current study and the methodology
utilized to generate each problem formulation. The predominant memory demands
for all problems are composed of storing Θ, a matrix of equal dimensions as Θ list-
ing all possibilities for each player of the cost sharing function, a matrix of possible
inspection combinations, and a set of constraint strings. The matrix of inspection
combinations is of type double with 2‖Φ‖ entries and each constraint string is as-
sumed to hold 56 characters requiring two bytes apiece. Figure 5 illustrates the
feasible (m,‖Φ‖)-combinations for instances we can formulate using 192GB of RAM
and the aforementioned structures in memory for the BIC, SP and GSP problems,
respectively. The blue portion of the graph represents feasible (m,‖Φ‖)-combinations
for all problem types. The red section indicates (m,‖Φ‖)-combinations feasible for
SP and BIC, while the green area indicates (m,‖Φ‖)-values feasible only for BIC.
Referencing Figures 4 and 5, we see the shape of the gray and green regions in each
respective graph are very similar, implying that our formulation generation methodol-
ogy is capable of creating an instance of BIC near the global upper bound of storing
only Θ with 192GB of RAM. However, the additional memory structures required
for SP and GSP become exceptionally burdensome and greatly limit the size of the
alliance we can consider.
For this reason, the ensuing section of large instance problems will only consider
the BIC formulation. The required data structures for SP and GSP cannot even be
stored in memory to build such instances.
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Figure 5. Feasible (m,‖Φ‖)-combination Formulations by Problem Type with 192 GB
RAM
4.3 Larger Instance Testing
Given the memory requirements for SP and GSP problems, we analyze the behav-
ior of BARON -reported optimal solutions for larger instances of the BIC problem.
However, the results of the previous section demonstrate that, for global alliances of
substantial size, solving even the BIC problem becomes impractical. The larger in-
stances herein examined are loosely based on UNASUR, a 12-nation alliance in South
America analogous to the EU. Considering memory limitations, we set ‖Φ‖ = 5. We
again utilize the PSIE objective function with equal weights.
We conduct a full block design experiment with two factors: (1) the clustering of
types in Φ, and (2) the composition of nation probability distributions over Φ. One
possible interpretation of these factors is to consider them as the possible degree of
wealthy disparity and the probability of existing a large amount of wealthy alliance
nations in relative terms, respectively. The clustering factor is divided into five levels
(i.e., five possible reserve price declarations), as described in Table 7. We consider
alliances with a High End Cluster with Outlier (HEO), Low End Cluster with Outlier
(LEO), High End Cluster (HEC), Low End Cluster (LEC), and Balanced (BAL)
clustering of available types in Φ. The HEO and LEO levels represent situations
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wherein a majority of available types lie close to one end of the spectrum, but an
outlier exists near the opposite end. In HEO, the majority of available types represent
a high valuation of the alliance with a single low valuation. LEO is the opposite
representing a majority low valuation of the alliance, and a single high valuation.
HEC and LEC are the same as HEO and LEO, but without the outliers. The final
clustering factor, BAL, represents a scenario where valuations of the alliance are
evenly spread between low and high valuations. These factors attempt to capture
behavior exhibited from an alliance composed entirely or primarily of wealthy nations
(HEC and HEO, respectively), entirely or primarily of less affluent nations (LEC and
LEO, respectively), and of an even mixture of the two (BAL). Specifically, the HEO
and LEO factors are designed to explore possibilities associated with behavior seen
in NATO wherein a majority of the burden is born by a minority of the more affluent
alliance members, as discussed in Olson & Zeckhauser [1966]. The second factor
concerning the composition of nation probability distributions over Φ analyzes the
effects of different types of uncertainty on the mechanism’s parameters. We consider
three levels of compositions as seen in Table 8. The first is an equitable population
such that an identical number of players have a uniform, right skewed, left skewed, or
symmetric distribution over Φ. The second and third compositions are either right
skewed or left skewed wherein a plurality of players are predisposed to lower or higher
valuations, respectively. The probabilities associated with each player distribution can
be found in Table 8, and the levels of the population composition factor can be found
in Table 9. Our full block design experiment will analyze all fifteen combinations of the
five levels on the clustering factor and the three levels on the population composition.
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Table 7. Larger Instance Testing: Categorical Factors on Clustering of Types in Φ
Clustering of Types in Φ φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5
High End Cluster with Outlier (HEO) 0.15 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90
Low End Cluster with Outlier (LEO) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.70
High End Cluster (HEC) 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90
Low End Cluster (LEC) 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
Balanced (BAL) 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
Table 8. Larger Instance Testing: Possible Nation Distributions Over Φ
Cluster of Types in Φ P(φ1) P(φ2) P(φ3) P(φ4) P(φ5)
Uniform (UNF) 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Right Skewed Distribution (RS) 0.30 0.40 0.20 0.05 0.05
Left Skewed Distribution (LS) 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.4 0.30
Symmetric Distribution (SYM) 0.05 0.20 0.50 0.20 0.05
Table 9. Composition of Nation Distributions in Populations
Possible Distribution Types UNF RS LS SYM
Equitable Population 3 3 3 3
Right Skewed Population 0 6 3 3
Left Skewed Population 0 3 6 3
As with the small instance testing, the majority of solution time required for
each instance is due to constraint generation. Each of the 15 instances required
between five-and-a-half to six hours of build time, totaling approximately 88 hours
of computation time. However, BARON required less than a single second to solve
any given instance. The values for the decision variables of the experiments can be
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Equitable Population
Right Skewed Population Left Skewed Population
Figure 6. Decision Variable Results in the 12 Player and 5 Type Full Block Experiment
seen graphically in Figure 6, and higher fidelity information on the decision variables,
objective function values, and computational effort required is available in Table 10.
Analyzing the objective function values with an equitable population composition
across all levels of the clustering factors in Table 10, we see the pure low end cluster
(LEC) and high end cluster (HEC) levels yield the lowest objective function values,
whereas, the highest two objective function values are obtained from the LEO and
BAL levels, respectively. This trend also holds under the right skewed population
composition. In contrast, in the left skewed composition, HEC and HEO have the
lowest objective function value, but LEO and BAL remain the highest. Considering
each clustering individually, it can be observed that deception provides varying levels
of benefit. In both the LEC and the HEC, a successful deceptive declaration can
yield a maximum of 0.20 benefit, if a nation is of the highest type and dishonestly
declares the lowest reserve price available (disregarding any potential subsidies from
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other dishonest players). However, the same logic reveals that in the HEO and LEO
the largest deceitful benefit is 0.65 and in BAL the value is 0.8. With these potential
deception benefits in mind, the rationale behind the aforementioned objective function
results begins to take form.
Across all clustering factors and population composition factor combinations, we
observe inspection probabilities are decreasing across types in ascending rank order.
That is, a type lower in value than another has a higher corresponding inspection
probability. Inspection of the individual decision variable values and a knowledge of
the underlying factors portends an explanation of BARON’s solutions, which again
relies upon the benefit of deception. For example, the LEC and HEC types are
tightly clustered, yielding small potential deception benefits for nations of any true
type, with a maximum of 0.20. The lower relative inspection probabilities of LEC
and HEC across all population compositions are representative of the smaller benefits
in deceit. Under LEO, a nation of true type φ5 can benefit substantially from a
successful deceptive bid of any of the other four types ranging from 0.50 to 0.65.
Thus, we see high p1 through p4 values across all population compositions. Inherent
in the structure of the type space, many different declarations have the ability to
substantially reward deception in LEO or BAL. In either scenario, a player of type φ5
has an array of declarations which would significantly reduce their contribution on a
successful deceptive bid. For this reason, we observe these two clustering factors yield
the highest penalties and generally high inspection probabilities. Similar analysis on
HEO reveals a high probability of inspection on the lowest declarable reserve price
and a large underbidding penalty is required to deter a player of a higher type to not
declare φ1.
Finally, several trends are visible with regard to solution times. Build times show
a slightly increasing trend over population composition factors from equitable popula-
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tions to right skewed populations and to left skewed populations. However, BARON
solve times demonstrate notable differences over clustering factors. The LEO and
HEO clustered problems require nearly a second to solve over all population compo-
sitions. HEC and BAL are comparable in requiring BARON times of approximately
one third of a second. LEC uniformly requires the least amount of time, approxi-
mately one tenth of a second.
Based on these combined results, in general, the clustering factor is more signif-
icant than the population composition factor. This result is visible by inspection of
Figure 6. All three population composition graphs look nearly identical, with the
exception of the increased xL value in the left skewed population when compared to
the other two compositions. We also conjecture that optimal inspection probabilities
are decreasing, or at least non-increasing, over types in ascending rank order. Finally,
the elevated BARON solve times for HEO and LEO compared to the other instances
leads us to conjecture these problems induce a higher degree of non-convexity.
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Table 10. Decision Variable Values, Objective Function Values and Computational Effort in the 12 Player, 5 Type Block
Experiment
Symmetric Population Right Skewed Population Left Skewed Population
Clustering HEO LEO HEC LEC BAL HEO LEO HEC LEC BAL HEO LEO HEC LEC BAL
p1 0.352 0.345 0.124 0.112 0.325 0.346 0.332 0.123 0.115 0.314 0.348 0.337 0.124 0.15 0.317
p2 0.081 0.335 0.095 0.110 0.245 0.079 0.32 0.094 0.112 0.237 0.08 0.325 0.094 0.145 0.239
p3 0.054 0.326 0.064 0.098 0.162 0.054 0.308 0.064 0.098 0.158 0.054 0.314 0.064 0.129 0.159
p4 0.028 0.317 0.033 0.073 0.080 0.027 0.298 0.033 0.068 0.079 0.027 0.304 0.033 0.087 0.08
p5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
xL 0.38 0.885 0.286 0.353 0.613 0.377 0.862 0.285 0.354 0.601 0.378 0.869 0.286 0.443 0.606
xH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DV Sum 0.895 2.208 0.602 0.746 1.425 0.883 2.12 0.599 0.747 1.389 0.887 2.149 0.601 0.954 1.401
Build Time (sec) 21395.26 20664.14 20885.93 19437.85 18905.30 21547.73 20918.44 20995.44 20109.41 20528.56 21441.11 21204.22 21251.48 21210.87 21527.84
BARON Time (sec) 0.742 0.450 0.326 0.134 0.442 0.915 0.768 0.406 0.160 0.368 0.909 0.810 0.353 0.101 0.322
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V. Conclusion
The declarable types in Φ are meant to represent the varying levels of worth a
member state can place on an alliance. Since the types in Φ are the reserve prices of
member nations in terms of the total proportion of alliance cost each nation is willing
to contribute, differing definitions can be inferred on the meaning of worth. That is, a
wealthy nation may feel ambivalent to the mission of an alliance but be willing to make
an equitable contribution in proportion to the alliance cost. Similarly, a less affluent
nation may feel strongly about the mission and choose to contribute a substantial
amount. The implementation of a cost sharing mechanism for an international alliance
is designed to elicit such preferences, limit the ability of a nation to exploit another,
and reduce the risk of a single country disproportionately bearing part of the collective
burden.
The current research examines optimization formulations having mechanisms that
guarantee truthfulness among members by imposing constraints of variable strength.
While any feasible solution to the BIC, SP, and GSP formulations correspond to
games having a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, a Nash Equilibrium in dominant strategies,
and a collusion resistant Nash equilibrium, respectively, an optimal solution to any
of these problems yields an game based on the central authority’s preferences. Each
problem is non-convex and thus requires a global solver to find an optimal or near
optimal solution. For very large alliances with many possible type declarations, all
three of the problem variants are subject to memory limitations. However, it has
been shown that the BIC problem is solvable in a reasonable amount of time for
intermediate-sized instances. For such instances, the optimal solutions have been
observed to be more sensitive to the clustering of types available for declarations
than for the probability distributions over them.
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5.1 Limitations
We note that some of the underlying assumptions of this research are impossible
or improbable to occur in real world scenarios. Specifically, perfect inspection will
not occur. Should an alliance assume a cost sharing mechanism as described, there
would certainly be some error in discerning a nation’s true type. Furthermore, the
notion of a nation’s true type is somewhat nebulous. A nation is not a single actor,
but rather a collection of individuals. Thus, a single uniform valuation of an alliance
in this context is unlikely. Instead, some variant of a social choice function would
likely be required to ascertain an agreeable value for the nation. In practice, this
value would likely not be voted on by the population but instead determined by a
small number of national leaders.
Likewise, deception as described in this research is binary. However, we note that
it is possible and, moreover, it is probable that Φ is composed of some highly dense
set of values between zero and one. In such a situation, the mechanism described in
this research would consider a bid very close, but still lower, than the true reserve
price (e.g., one ten millionth), as a deceptive act. However, such a bid could easily
be attributed to error from the nation or the central authority.
In general, a central authority ascertaining truthful preferences in any situation
is dubious. Even if it were possible in an international alliance, inevitable political
contention would ensue as the central authority attempted to collect the deception
penalties, especially if the mechanism required overbidding penalties. If a central
authority is not deemed credible by every country (i.e., some countries refuse to
pay their penalties), the equilibrium results will not hold. The direct application of
this research to an international alliance may not then be advisable. However, it
is able to provide a bound on the effort required to ensure truthfulness in different
equilibriums, and an understanding of what would be required to limit the effect
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of dishonest political maneuver and coercion in an alliance. It also deviates from
traditional burden sharing literature focusing on a central authority directly setting
burden shares. Instead, the mechanisms in this research calculate the burden shares
on the importance each nation places on the alliance.
5.2 Future Work
Quantifying the effects of probabilistic versus perfect inspection is a warranted
sequel to this research. Likewise, given the memory limitations for analyzing very
large alliances, there may exist a method to accurately aggregate an alliance’s member
nations into blocks such that a meaningful problem with respect to NATO or the UN
is solvable. The underlying cost sharing function in this research is cross-monotonic.
Alternative cross-monotonic cost sharing functions, or those which are not cross-
monotonic, should be analyzed to determine if similar behavior is encountered.
If a cross sharing function that is not cross monotonic is selected, it may lose the
property of being in the core, but it could be selected in such a way that it still exists
in either the least core or the nucleolus. Should existence be in the least core, the allo-
cation is such that the cost of deviating from the grand coalition, ε, has been reduced
to the least feasible value. In contrast, existence in the nucleolus implies the max-
imum dissatisfaction of the grand coalition is minimized. Finally, the BIC problem
assumes the independence of valuations by each member state. This property may be
reasonable in general cost sharing circumstances; however, an international alliance
may include countries with dependent types (e.g., the close historical relationship be-
tween the US and the UK). In such a scenario, the optimization problems as described
are no longer appropriate and must be adapted to account for this interdependence.
Finally, the extension of this research to a corporate setting may allow for the
direct application of the explored mechanisms. For this to occur, the central authority
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must have enough power and credibility to enforce inspections and penalities. One
such application may be the sharing of cost in a multi-party arbitration setting.
However, it may be that the involved parties are no longer declaring reserve prices, but
payment capacities. Other changes to the interpretations of the parameters utilized
in this research would likely follow.
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